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CASENOTES

BANKRUPTCY LAW:

MONEY - THAT'S WHAT THEY WANT

...BUT SHOULD THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES OF OFFICIAL
UNSECURED

CREDITORS'

COMMITTEES

BE

REIMBURSED

FROM

THE BANKRUPTCY DEBTOR'S ESTATE?-In re George Worthing-

ton Co., 921 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1990) and In re Federated Department Stores, Inc., 121 B.R. 332 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The bankruptcy courts disagree over whether Congress intended
official' unsecured creditors' committees to be reimbursed from the
debtor's estate for the administrative expenses they incur during a
bankruptcy proceeding. 2 The courts have used various Bankruptcy
I. The reference to the unsecured creditors' committee as "official" is intended to distinguish committees which are mandatorily formed pursuant to section 1102(a)(l) of the Bankruptcy
Code from those which are not mandatorily formed. See I I U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988). Section
1102 of the Bankruptcy Code mandates the appointment of a committee of creditors holding
unsecured claims "as soon as practicable" after a debtor is granted chapter 11 relief. Id. Its
formation is not discretionary. Id. Section 1102(a)(1) reads in part. "As soon as practicable after
the order for relief under Chapter I I of this title, the United States trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims." Id. (emphasis added).
2. The bankruptcy courts granted reimbursement in the following cases: In re Aviation
Technical Support, Inc., 72 B.R. 32 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987); In re Windsor Communications
Group, Inc., 54 B.R. 504 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); In re General Oil Distrib., Inc., 51 B.R. 794
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Global Int'l Airways Corp., 45 B.R. 258 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984);
In re Malden Mills, Inc., 42 B.R. 476 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984); In re Labine, 42 B.R. 883 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1984); In re Toy & Sports Warehouse, Inc., 38 B.R. 646 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); In
re GHR Energy Corp., 35 B.R. 539 (Bankr. D. Mass 1984); In re Pennsylvania Tire & Rubber
Co. of Miss., 25 B.R. 18 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); In re Grynberg, 19 B.R. 621 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1982); In re Fireside Office Supply, Inc., 17 B.R. 43 (Bankr. D. Minn 1981). Also, in In re
Federated Department Stores, Inc., the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio
granted reimbursement to a retirees' committee formed pursuant to section 1114. 121 B.R. 332
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
The bankruptcy courts denied reimbursement in the following cases: In re Automotive Nat'l
Brands, Inc., 65 B.R. 412 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986); In re InterstateRestaurant Sys., Inc., 30 B.R.
32 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); In re Lyons Mach. Co., 28 B.R. 600 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1983); In re
Major Dynamics, Inc., 16 B.R. 279 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981).
Two United States district courts granted reimbursement. In re Jennings, 96 B.R. 500 (E.D.
Pa. 1989); In re Evans Prod. Co., 62 B.R. 579 (S.D. Fla. 1986). Two federal appellate courts also
considered the issue. The Sixth Circuit favored reimbursement. In re George Worthington Co.,
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4
Codes (the "Code") provisions to achieve their respective results, but
all have agreed that the source of the confusion stems from the lack of
specific statutory authorization in the Code to reimburse these committees.5 Court opinions written in support of and in opposition to reimbursement exhibit that solid reasoning and interpretation is possible for
either stance.' The logical remedy for the problem is for Congress to
enact a clarifying amendment. 7 Until that time, in addition to interpreting the Code, courts must decide whether it is in the best interest
of the bankruptcy process to place yet another financial obligation on
the debtor's estate."
In re George Worthington Co.' is reflective of the unpredictable
approach to the issue which courts have taken thus far. The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted a rehearing after its initial denial
of reimbursement.'0 The opinion denying the reimbursement detailed
the history of disagreement among the bankruptcy courts" and concluded that statutory authorization to reimburse could not be found
either in the existing Code provisions or in the relevant legislative hismajority of
tory. 2 Remarkably, upon rehearing, the court retained 1the
3
itself.
reversed
succinctly
but
opinion
earlier
text in its
In re Federated Department Stores, Inc. 4 is indicative of the dissatisfaction many courts feel with the absence of specific statutory authority to reimburse official unsecured creditors' committees. Among
other things, the Federated court noted the importance of encouraging
the most qualified of the potential committee members to participate

921 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1990). The Seventh Circuit denied it. In re UNR Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d
1136 (7th Cir. 1984).
3. It U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988) (hereinafter "Code").
4. See, e.g., UNR Indus., 736 F.2d 1136 (denying reimbursement based on 11 U.S.C. §
330); Global Int'l., 45 B.R. 258 (authority for court to reimburse found in 11 U.S.C. §
503(b)(1)(A)); Labine, 42 B.R. 883 (authority for court to reimburse found in 11 U.S.C. §
503(b)).
5. See, e.g., Worthington, 921 F.2d 626 (no express provision in Code to reimburse section
1102 committees); Toy & Sports, 38 B.R. at 647 (Code is silent with regard to reimbursement).
6. See sources cited supra note 2.
7. See generally Karen A. Pulliam, Christopher G. Yates & Donald P. Brewster, Reimbursement of Creditors' Committee Members' Costs and Expenses under Section 503(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code, 94 CoM. LJ. 93, 121 (1989) (suggests how Congress should amend section
503(b)).
8. See generally SOL STEIN, A FEAST FOR LAWYERS - INSIDE CHAPTER 11: AN EXPOSE
(1989) (presents view that debtor is victimized in bankruptcy process).
9. 921 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1990).
10. In re George Worthington Co., 921 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1990).
11. In re George Worthington Co., 913 F.2d 316, 319-25 (6th Cir. 1990).
12. Id. at 326.
13. Worthington, 921 F.2d 626.
14. 121 B.R. 332 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/9
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on the committee and viewed the denial of reimbursement for administrative expenses as a disincentive to participation.1" Hence, the court
determined that it would allow reimbursement."
This note will present arguments to motivate and enable the bankruptcy courts to uniformly decide this issue based on the Code in its
present form. Part II of this note provides the facts and holdings of In
re George Worthington Co. and In re Federated Department Stores,
Inc. as illustrative of the difficulty courts are having in attempting to
resolve this problem. Part III explores the legislative history behind the
current absence of a Bankruptcy Code provision addressing reimbursement of administrative expenses for official unsecured creditors' committees. Part IV presents and analyzes the various Code provisions
upon which courts have relied for their determinations of whether to
reimburse. Finally, as noted above, it is the aim of this note to select a
reasonable course of action for courts to follow which will avoid the
unusual results of such cases as Worthington and Federated.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDINGS

Pursuant to section 1102(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, the
United States trustee is directed to appoint "a committee of creditors
holding unsecured claims . . . as soon as practicable" after the order
for the debtor's Chapter 11 relief.' 7 The decision whether to appoint
the committee is not left to the discretion of the trustee, for the Code
instructs that the trustee "shall appoint a committee."'" The trustee
refers to section 1102(b)(1) as a guideline for appointing creditors who
should serve.'" This section prescribes the desired composition of the
committee.
The official section 1102 committee is empowered and obligated to
perform the activities set out in section 1103.20 The committee must

15. Id. at 334-35.
16. Id. at 335.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988).
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. Id. § 1102(b)(l). The committee represents all the debtor's unsecured creditors.
Id.
Section 1102(b)(l) states:
A committee of creditors appointed under subsection (a) of this section shall ordinarily
consist of the persons, willing to serve, that hold the seven largest claims against the debtor
or the kinds represented on such committee, or of the members of a committee organized
by creditors before the commencement of the case under this chapter, if such committee
was fairly chosen and is representative of the different kinds of claims to be represented.
Id.
20. Id. § 1103. Section 1103 sets out the powers and duties of committees as follows:
(c) A committee appointed under section 1102 of this title may(1) consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning the administration of
the case;
Published by eCommons, 1991
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investigate any matter concerning the debtor which might impact on
the favorability of continuing the debtor's business and of formulating
a reorganization plan. 1 The committee's goal is to protect the interests
of all the unsecured creditors of a debtor. This requires monitoring the
debtor's activities to guarantee that any decisions being made are in the
best interests of the unsecured creditors.
Conducting the activities necessary to accomplish committee goals
causes the committee to incur expenses. Due to the committee members' attendance at and participation in committee meetings, the types
2
of expenses that can be incurred are for lodging, travel, and meals.
The Bankruptcy Code does not provide specific statutory authorization
to reimburse the creditors who serve on an official creditors' committee
for these expenses. In 1990, the Sixth Circuit confronted the issue
which has continued to haunt the bankruptcy courts: Should the courts
grant reimbursement to the unsecured creditors' committee for its expenses when there is no clear congressional authorization to do so? The
issue may seem insignificant, but Worthington illustrates how difficult
it is for courts to resolve.
On September 24, 1986, "The George Worthington Company,
filed a voluntary petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of Title
11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code."' 23 Pursuant to section

(2) investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the
debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of
such business, and any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan;
(3) participate in the formulation of a plan, advise those represented by such committee of such committee's determinations as to any plan formulated, and collect and file with
the court acceptances or rejections of a plan;
(4) request the appointment of a trustee or examiner under section 1104 of this title;
and
(5) perform such other services as are in the interest of those represented.
11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(l)-(5) (1989).
21. Id.
11-29.04 at 14 (14th ed. 1976); Richard Niles
22. See 14 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
Chassin, Comment, Judicial Misinterpretations of Creditors' Committees, I BANKR. DEv. J. 107,
120 (1984).
23. In re George Worthington Co., 913 F.2d 316, 317 (1990). A Chapter 11 reorganization
has two main purposes. 2 NORTON BANKR. LAW AND PRAC. § 49.01, at 3 (1991). Congress
designed the reorganization process as a means to preserve the value of a business for the sake of
the creditors and to give the debtor "a second chance" to revive the business. Id. Reorganization
may be commenced by filing a petition voluntarily or involuntarily. Id. § 50.03-.04, at 10-11.
Involuntary filing may be accomplished upon the initiative of one or more of the debtor's creditors.
Id. § 50.04, at 11. A debtor may also voluntarily file a bankruptcy petition. Id. § 50.03, at 10.
Upon filing, an automatic stay is invoked which generally prevents creditors from asserting claims
or foreclosing against the debtor. Id. § 49.10, at 30. The goal is to formulate a workable plan
which adequately satisfies the creditors' claims against the debtor while simultaneously achieving
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/9
the debtor's financial reorganization. Id. § 49.01, at 3.
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1102(a), an unsecured creditors' committee was mandatorily appointed.2 These unsecured creditors of the company held "claims of
over $13 million." 2 5 The committee sought interim reimbursement for
its administrative expenses of $12,050.9426 and final reimbursement of
an additional $4,676.16 .27 The bankruptcy court denied each request
holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize reimbursement
for statutory committees, or, more specifically, for committees formed
pursuant to section 1102(a)(1). 2 8 On appeal, the federal district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's denials of reimbursement29
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit first decided the
Worthington case in September 1990. In its opinion, the court surveyed
the legislative history behind the lack of an express Code provision
which would address reimbursement for unsecured creditors' committees.30 It also analyzed the various statutory provisions upon which
other courts have relied for their allowance or disallowance of reimbursement. 31 Finally, the court, given the entire Code upon which to
find a basis for its decision, joined the Seventh Circuit3 2 and affirmed
the disallowance of reimbursement.3 3
The Sixth Circuit was determined not to engage in judicial legislating - a practice which is antithetical to separation of powers principles.3 4 The court's deference to Congress, by its refusal to find meaning
in the Code which the legislature did not intend, was short lived. Only
three months later, the Sixth Circuit reversed itself on rehearing and
thereby gave the official unsecured creditors' committee the reimbursement it sought.3 5
24. Worthington, 913 F.2d at 317.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 318.
30. Id. at 318-19.
31. Id. at 319-26.
32. See In re UNR Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 1136 (7th Cir. 1984).
33. Worthington, 913 F.2d at 326.
34. Id. at 326 (Congress should supply remedy, not the court); see also In re Timbers
of
Inwood Forest, 793 F.2d 1380, 1384 (5th Cir. 1986) (court must avoid intrusion into
the legislative function), affid, 484 U.S. 365 (1988). One Supreme Court Justice has stated:
[Courts] are under the constraints imposed by the judicial function in our democratic
society . . . .[N]o one will gainsay that the function in construing a statute is to ascertain
the
meaning of words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power which
our
democracy has lodged in its elected legislature. The great judges have constantly admonished their brethren of the need for discipline in observing the limitations. A judge
must
not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it.
Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 533
(1947) (emphasis added).
35. In re George
Co., 921 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1990).
Published by eCommons,Worthington
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Rather than rest its new decision on any specific Code provision,
the court found the right to reimburse "implied in the overall scheme
for reorganization and in the legislative history of the Code and its
amendments."" 6 The court retained its survey approach but evinced a
different perspective in its analysis. For example, in its September opinion the court discussed the reasoning of the United States District
37
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in In re Jennings. The
district court in Jennings recognized the anomaly that a restrictive
reading of section 503(b)(3)(D) 3 8 would allow reimbursement for unofficial unsecured creditors' committees but prohibit it for their official
counterparts.39 The Jennings court observed that such a reading would
undermine the statutory mechanism for the creation of unsecured cred4
itors' committees by discouraging participation in an official capacity.
In spite of this insight, the Worthington court originally discounted the
observation as "merely speculative" and noted that a creditor might be
equally motivated to participate on an official committee based upon an
expectation of at least partial satisfaction of its claim against the
debtor.4"
In its December opinion, the court cited the same reasoning from
Jennings regarding the anomaly that a restrictive reading of section
503(b)(3)(D) would produce. 2 This time, however, the Sixth Circuit
went no further than to observe that depriving the official committee of
reimbursement would discourage participation of unsecured creditors in
an official capacity. Apparently, the Worthington court no longer regarded this observation as merely speculative. Upon rehearing, the
George Worthington Co.'s official unsecured creditors' committee was
granted its reimbursement."
In the interim between the original disposition of the Worthington
committee's case and its disposition upon rehearing, 5 the Bankruptcy

36. Id. at 634.
37. Worthington, 913 F.2d at 324 (discussing In Re Jennings, 96 B.R. 500 (E.D. Pa.
1989)).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) (1988).
39. Jennings, 96 B.R. at 502.
40. Id. (citation omitted).
41. Worthington, 913 F.2d at 324.
42. In re George Worthington Co., 921 F.2d 626, 633-34 (6th Cir. 1990); see supra notes
38-40 and accompanying text.
43. Worthington, 921 F.2d at 634.
44. Id.
45. In support of the Worthington creditors' committee's petition for rehearing, the Federated committee filed a memorandum as amici curiae. Id. at 628. It is possible that the Federated
decision influenced the Worthington court to reverse its denial of reimbursement, but the Worthington opinion fails to mention the Federated decision beyond the notation that a memorandum in
support was filed. If the Worthington court was so influenced, it is not apparent from its final,
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/9
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Court for the Southern District of Ohio confronted a similar controversy in In re Federated Department Stores, Inc."' The bankruptcy
court had previously authorized the appointment of an official retirees'
committee pursuant to section 1114(c)(2)' 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. "8
The committee would represent 6,400 retirees and attempt to restore
post-retirement benefits which were terminated by Federated Department Stores and Allied Stores Corp. upon the companies' respective
Chapter 11 filings. "9 The court issued an order to clarify whether the
committee to be appointed could be reimbursed for its administrative
expenses in light of the September 1990 Worthington opinion which
denied reimbursement.o The Federated court's predicament lay in the
possible binding nature of the Sixth Circuit's original opinion. Its predilection was to reimburse the retirees' committee and thereby encourage qualified retirees to participate.5 1 The court felt that denying
the committee's reimbursement would emasculate the congressional intent behind section 1114.52 "Congress intended section 1114 to provide
for the appointment of qualified retirees to negotiate on behalf of their
fellow retirees. Congress could not have intended to disqualify prospective committee members if they could not pay their expenses." 5 3
While recognition of congressional intent was important, it was not
enough to avoid the September 1990 Worthington mandate. Therefore,
the Federated court limited the reach of Worthington by emphasizing
that court's reliance on a different Code section. Though a Code source
for reimbursing statutory committees is absent for section 1114 committees as well as for section 1102 committees, the court noted that
published opinion which does not incorporate the Federated reasoning (i.e., citing the
broad equity
powers given the court by section 105).
46. 121 B.R. 332 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 11 14(c)(2) (1988). Section 11 14(c)(2) reads:
In cases where the labor organization referred to in paragraph (1)elects not to serve
as the
authorized representative of those persons receiving any retiree benefits covered
by any
collective bargaining agreement to which that labor organization is signatory,
or in cases
where the court, pursuant to paragraph (1) finds different representation of such persons
appropriate, the court, upon a motion by any party in interest, and after notice
and a
hearing, shall appoint a committee of retired employees if the debtor seeks to modify
or
not pay the retiree benefits or if the court otherwise determines that it is appropriate,
from among such persons, to serve as the authorized representative of such persons
under
this section.
Id. (emphasis added).
48. Federated, 121 B.R. at 333.
49. 2 Bankr. L. Rep. (BNA) 952-53 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 1990).
50. Federated, 121 B.R. at 333.
51. Id. at 334-35.
52. Id. at 334.
53. Id.
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Worthington had not decided the issue whether section 1114 committees were entitled to reimbursement of expenses.14 In this manner, Federated disentangled itself from the Sixth Circuit's decision and explored new terrain.
The court further distanced itself from Worthington by noting that
section 1114 committee members were authorized representatives
which gave them "extraordinary powers to modify benefits and bind
their members.""6 The court concluded that section 1114 committees
6
were extraordinary committees created by extraordinary legislation.
Having established and emphasized the exceptional nature of the retirees' committee, the court found its statutory authority to reimburse
"under the broad equitable powers of section 105."1 The court stressed
the potential undercutting of section 1114 objectives and the inequity
which could result for all affected retirees if the court did not use its
section 105 powers.6 8 The foreseeable significant expenses of committee
service combined with the concern that the interests of the retirees that
their interests be effectively represented supported the court's
rationale.6 9
If the bankruptcy court in Federated had faced the December
1990 Worthington decision which allowed reimbursement for statutory
committees, the Federatedcourt might have taken a different approach
in its decision. It could have broadened the Worthington holding by
reasoning that it was binding for section 1114 committees as well as for
section 1102 committees. Whether or not a court is inclined to reimburse creditors' committee members' expenses, Worthington and Federated illustrate that the uncertainty over which result is correct enables courts to engage in creative analysis in order to reach their
desired results.
III.

BACKGROUND

The following legislative history traces how the reimbursement of
official unsecured creditors' committees became such a controversial
and confused issue. In 1978, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform
61
Act 0 which is codified as Title 11 of the United States Code. The

54. Id. at 333.
55. Id. at 334.
56. Id.
57. Id. Section 105 reads in pertinent part: "The court may issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." II U.S.C. §
105 (1988).
58. Federated, 121 B.R. at 334.
59. Id.
60. Pub. L. No. 95-528, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
61. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/9
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1978 Code was much needed after years of relying on the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898.62 The 1898 Act proved inadequate as industry changed
and the world expanded.13 In spite of substantial modification in 1938,
the 1898 Act had become "much too inflexible and antiquated to deal
with consumer and business financial failures in modern society.""'
But the starting point of the controversy and confusion surrounding administrative expense reimbursement was not the adoption of the
1978 Act. The new Act did not mark the end of reimbursement for
statutory unsecured creditors' committees because the 1898 Act had
also been silent on the reimbursement issue.65 Under the 1898 Act,
courts were reimbursing official unsecured creditors' committees pursuant to Rule 11-29(c) of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 6 Rule 1129(c) read in pertinent part: "Expenses deemed reasonable and necessary by the court incurred by the committee . . may also be allowed
as an expense of administration. ' e In addition, section 339 of the 1898
Act specifically allowed committee reimbursement for expenses realized
in hiring professionals.6 8 Notably, the comment to section 339 recognized that Rule 11-29(c) permitted "the discretionary allowance of expenses of committee members for their expenses incurred while serving
on the committee . . . if the court finds such expenses reasonable and
necessary."6 9
Upon the enactment of the 1978 Act, the same rules were said to
apply unless a provision in the new Act effectively abrogated them.70
These rules were operative until they were superseded on August 1,
1983 by the new Bankruptcy Rules pursuant to section 2075 of Title 28
of the United States Code.7 1 The new Bankruptcy Rules eliminated
any express mention of administrative expense reimbursement for statutory unsecured creditors' committees. 72 The only relevant reference to
.

62. ALAN RESNICK & EUGENE WYPYSKI, 1 BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1979) (see first page of Preface where authors note the significance of the
1978
Act).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Karen A. Pulliam, Christopher G. Yates & Donald P. Brewster, Reimbursement of
Creditors' Committee Members' Costs and Expenses under Section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code, 94 CoM. L.J. 93, 101 (1989).
66. Id.
67. 14 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 1 11-29.04 (14th ed. 1976) (sets out and discusses old
rule).
68. Pulliam, Yates & Brewster, supra note 65, at 102.
69. Id. (citing I COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION, Bankruptcy Act and Rules 393 (1976)).
70. Id. at 102 (citing Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405(d), 92
Stat. 2549, 2684 (1978)).
71. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1988).
Id.
Published72.
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the prior practice is in Rule 2016(a) and its Advisory Committee
4
Note 73 which together implement section 330 of the Code.
Rule 2016(a) generally provides the mechanism for compensation
or reimbursement of necessary expenses. 5 Its Advisory Committee
Note states that Rule 2016(a) "includes within its provisions a committee member."' 76 This might lead one to believe that Rule 2016(a) allows
reimbursement for the necessary expenses of a committee, but since the
rule is intended to implement section 330, the proviso for such an allowance is less clear. Section 330 operates for officers or professional
77
people employed by the committee and not for the committee itself.
Hence, the significance of the reference to "a committee member" in
Rule 2016(a)'s Advisory Committee Note is unclear and has been de-.
8
bated by the courts in the search for a statutory source to reimburse.
Thus, the courts are left with little in the way of the present Code
and Bankruptcy Rules to inform them whether to reimburse official unsecured creditors' committees. What follows is a discussion of the array
of sources with which the courts have struggled in their attempts to
permanently resolve the controversy.
IV.

ANALYSIS

Since it is nearly impossible to determine whether Congress' failure to carry over the procedure in Rule 11-29(c) was an oversight or an
intentional exclusion, the question remains whether the courts should
provide the remedy or await congressional remedial action. When
asked by an official unsecured creditors' committee to prescribe a solution, many courts have examined the thoughtful suggestions made by
litigants and amici curiae, but overall the courts have failed to reach
uniform results. The various suggested bases for reimbursement are
Rule 2016(a) and its Advisory Committee Note, section 503(b)(3)(d),
section 503(b), section 105, proposed amendments to the Code, and

73. Id. (citing I COLLIER ON
(15th ed. 1979)).
74.

BANKRUPTCY,

Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, 1327 app.

NORTON BANKR. RULES PAMPHLET 153 (1990-91 ed.).

75. Rule 2016(a) reads in relevant part:
An entity seeking interim or final compensation for services, or reimbursement of necessary
expenses, from the estate shall file with the court an application setting forth a detailed
statement of (1) the services rendered, time expended and expenses incurred, and (2) the
amounts requested . . . .The requirements of this subdivision shall apply to an application
for compensation for services rendered by an attorney or accountant even though the application is filed by a creditor or other entity.
Id. at 152.
76. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
77. See 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1988).
78. See infra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/9
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even a brief exchange between Senators Dole and DeConcini in 1984. 7 1
The merit of each as a potential statutory source for reimbursement
will be analyzed, and a solution proposed which will enable courts to
treat uniformly the often overlooked victims of the debtor, the unsecured creditors.
A.

Rule 2016(a) and Accompanying Advisory Committee Note

As discussed in Part III of this note, Rule 2016(a) details a mechanism for applying for compensation or reimbursement of expenses.80
The rule states that an "entity seeking . . . reimbursement of necessary expenses from the estate shall file with the court an application." 81
The Rule's Advisory Committee Note clarifies that this section of the
rule "includes within its provisions a committee . . . when . . . reimbursement of expenses is sought from the estate."82 Courts have used
this rule in conjunction with its Advisory Note to defeat or justify expense reimbursement for official committees of unsecured creditors.
Most notably, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed
the possibility of Rule 2016(a) as a basis for reimbursement.8 3
The Seventh Circuit was the first court of appeals to consider the
issue of whether to reimburse the official unsecured creditors' committee in In re UNR Industries, Inc.. In UNR Industries, the creditors'
committee sought reimbursement of a variety of expenses including
"the cost of court reporters, translators and interpreters hired to aid in
conducting discovery on behalf of creditors.18 4 The committee relied on
section 330 of the Code as its source for arguing in favor of reimbursement.8 5 Section 330 provides for compensation for actual and necessary
services rendered by officers of the committee and reimbursement for
their actual and necessary expenses.8 6 The committee hoped to implicate the actual and necessary expenses of the committee, versus the

79. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
80. NORTON BANKR. RULES PAMPHLET 153 (1990-91 ed.).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 153.
83. In re UNR Indus., Inc. 736 F.2d 1136 (7th Cir. 1984).
84. Id. at 1136.
85. Id. at 1137.
86. 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1988). Section 330(a)(1)-(2) reads as follows:
(a) After notice to any parties in interest and to the United States trustee and a hearing,
and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329 of this title, the court may award to a trustee, to
an examiner, to a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 [provides for
service to 1102 committees] of this title, or to the debtor's attorney(1) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by such trustee,
examiner, professional person, or attorney, as the case may be, and by any
paraprofessional persons employed by such trustee, professional person, or attorney,
as the
case may be,
based on the nature, the extent, and the value of such services,
Published by
eCommons,
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expenses of the officers alone, in this statutory provision for
reimbursement.
The means used to extend the applicability of section 330 was
Rule 2016, the Bankruptcy Rule intended to implement this particular
Code section, and its accompanying Advisory Committee Note.8 7 Since
Rule 2016 speaks of "requirements for making an application for reimbursement""8 and its Advisory Note contemplates 'a committee' within
the Rule 2016 reference to an 'entity,' the committee argued that section 330 must therefore provide for reimbursement of the coinmittee's
expenses.8" The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument because "the
same [Advisory Committee] Note makes it clear that '[section] 330
sets forth'the bases for allowing compensation.' "90 The court found
that the substantive basis for reimbursement was lacking in section 330
and hence, the procedural rule could not be relied upon to provide the
necessary basis.91 The court restated the role of section 330 as providing a source for reimbursement of expenses incurred by officers who
are hired by the committee, and noted that the expenses of the committee itself were not addressed in section 330.92
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Massachusetts
in"
In re GHR Energy Corp.93 took an opposing position with reference
to Rule 2016, finding that reimbursement was permissible using the
Rule alone. 94 The court ignored Rule 2016's connection with section
330. Instead, the court cited the proposition from the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 which stated that rules not inconsistent with the
Act's provisions would continue to apply until repealed or superseded
by new rules.9 5 The guiding principle is that the rules are applicable to
the extent that they are not abrogated by new rules or the Code. The
GHR Energy court noted that the Bankruptcy Code is silent on the

the time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable services other than in a
case under this title; and
(2) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.
Id. (emphasis added).
87. UNR Indus., 736 F.2d at 1139.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (citation omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id.; accord In re Automotive Nat'l Brands, Inc., 65 B.R. 412, 413 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1986).
93. 35 B.R. 539 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983).
94. Id. The operation of Rule 2016 was very new to this court as the case was decided in
November, 1983, and the new rules had only become effective in August, 1983. Id. at 542.
95. Id. (citing Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405(d), 92 Stat.
2549, 2684 (1978)).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/9
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issue of official unsecured creditors' committees and reimbursement.9 6
It followed that the new rules which provided for such reimbursement
could still applyY7 Thus, the court noted that Rule 2016 and its inclusion of "a committee" by the Advisory Committee Note is a vital rule
in all possible respects because the Code failed to proscribe reimbursement of expenses for unsecured creditors' committees.9 8
There is good reason to accept the Seventh Circuit's position in
UNR Industries as more sound than the position taken by the GHR
Energy court. The Bankruptcy Rules are intended to implement the
Code by providing mechanisms for uniformity and ease of administration. If Rule 2016 is explicitly intended to implement section 330,
which in turn explicitly provides for compensation and reimbursement
of officers of the committee, Rule 2016 should not be construed to provide for reimbursement of general committee expenses as well.
The fact that Rule 2016(a) reads that "an entity" seeking reimbursement "shall file with the court an application" does not invite all
types of reimbursement for official unsecured creditors' committees. An
entity, or "committee" as allowed by the Advisory Committee Note,
must be considered as seeking reimbursement within the context of the
rule. For example, if a committee directly paid the compensation or
reimbursement for the officers it hired, certainly the committee could
take action under Rule 2016 to be reimbursed for the money paid out
to those officers almost as a matter of assignment. The committee
would step into the officers' shoes by paying the officers what was due
them and claim compensation or reimbursement under section 330.
This interpretation of Rule 2016 would not render the Advisory Committee Note's reference to "a committee" surplusage.
The GHR Energy view of Rule 2016 is untenable. The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 provided a plan for procedure during the transition between the old and the new bankruptcy acts.9 9 The old rules were
to continue in operation until superseded or repealed and retained general applicability during the time of transition. 00 Once the new rules
were enacted, anything that was not carried forward was effectively
eliminated and the means for transition was no longer necessary. The
new Code's plan for transition lost its pertinence upon the birth of the
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.; accord In re Malden Mills, Inc., 42 B.R. 476 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984); In re Toy &
Sports Warehouse, 38 B.R. 646 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
99. Karen A. Pulliam, Christopher G. Yates & Donald P. Brewster, Reimbursement of
Creditors' Committee Members' Costs and Expenses Under Section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code, 94 COM. L.J. 93, 102 (1989) (citing Bankruptcy Reform Act of1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, §
405(d), 92 Stat. 2549, 2684 (1978)).
100.
Id.
Published
by eCommons,
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new rules, whereas it was formerly necessary because the old rules were
not tailored to the new Code. On the other hand, the new rules are
tailored to the new Code sections, and anything in the new rules which
is apparently not addressed in the Code should not be deemed something resembling a new law. This is the untenable proposition made in
GHR Energy that, where the Code is seemingly silent, the rules are
free to authorize code-like transactions. The new rules work to achieve
the objectives of the Code. Rule 2016, as an instrument for section 330,
cannot independently authorize the reimbursement of expenses for official unsecured creditors' committees. Therefore, the view held in UNR
Industries respecting Rule 2016 is the proper one.
B.

Section 5031°1

Section 503 houses the biggest threat to the reimbursement of official unsecured creditors' committees, but also provides the most options
for supplying a statutory source to reimburse. Section 503 generally
authorizes payment of administrative expenses from the debtor's estate.1 02 Section 503(b)(3)(D) is the problematic provision.?"This section allows payment of the actual and necessary administrative expenses incurred by a committee representing creditors other than a
committee appointed under section 1102.104 Therefore, under section
503(b)(3)(D), an official creditors' committee appointed under section
1102 at first glance is not entitled to reimbursement. Whether this
clause acts as a prohibition to reimbursement or merely defines the
type of committee to which section 503(b)(3)(D) refers has been a debated question among the courts. In spite of this obstacle, courts have
proposed several statutory means for reimbursement under section 503;
a discussion of these, and the apparent obstacle, follows.
1. Section 503(b)(3)(D) - A Prohibition to Reimbursement?
Section 503(b)(3)(D) reads in relevant part: "[T]here shall be
allowed, administrative expenses . . . including - the actual, necessary
expenses . . . incurred by a . . . committee representing creditors ...
other than a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title, in
making a substantial contribution in a case." 10 5 Since the provision specifically excludes section 1102 committees from its parameters, and
since there is no other express authority in the Code to reimburse section 1102 committees, it has been argued that section 503(b)(3)(D)

101. 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1988).
102. See Id.
103. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) (1988).
104. Id.
105. Id. (emphasis added).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/9
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acts as an absolute prohibition to reimbursement of 1102 unsecured
creditors' committees. The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District
of Arkansas in In re Lyons Machinery Co.'06 expressed this very position: "Congress did not . . . give the Bankruptcy Court the actual authority or the discretion to allow reimbursement . . . . The language
contained in section 503(b)(3)(D) specifically prohibits authorization
of reimbursement of expenses incurred by the creditors' committee acting pursuant to section 1102."' 7 But other courts disagree and read
the clause "other than a committee appointed under section 1102" as
definitional.10 8 They assert that the committees which are subject to
section 503(b)(3)(D) are those which are not formed pursuant to section 1102 and are thereby required to make a "substantial contribution
in a case" as a prerequisite to reimbursement. 10 9
The committees which must meet this higher standard to receive
reimbursement are those committees not included in the negative definition. Not only must their expenses be actual and necessary but they
must also substantially contribute in a case. 1 0 This is a reasonable construction of the section 503(b)(3)(D) clause. It is logical to require unofficial committees, which are not mandatorily created by the Code, to
meet a higher standard in order to qualify for reimbursement in contrast with the standard for those committees which are created
mandatorily and are fulfilling particular statutory duties."' If unofficial
committees were able to receive reimbursement for administrative expenses which did not substantially contribute to a case, a significant
drain on the debtor's estate might ensue. Consequently, this reading
and interpretation of the negative definition in section 503(b)(3)(D)
leads to the conclusion that the section does not prohibit reimbursement of committees formed pursuant to section 1102. Rather, it
simply limits the reimbursement of expenses of unofficial creditors'
committees.

106.

28 B.R. 600 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1983).
107. Id. at 602; accord In re Interstate Restaurant Sys., Inc., 30 B.R. 32 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1983); In re Major Dynamics, Inc., 16 B.R. 279 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981).
108. See In re George Worthington Co., 921 F.2d 626, 632 (6th Cir. 1990); In re GHR
Energy Corp., 35 B.R. 539, 540-41 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983).
109.

See, e.g., GHR Energy, 35 B.R. at 540-41.

110.

See 11 U.S.C § 503(d)(3) (1988).

Ill.by See
In re Labine,
42
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Other Section 503 Sources

The fact that section 503(b)(3)(D) does not prohibit reimbursement of unsecured creditors' committees for their administrative expenses does not solve the problem that no provision specifically authorizes such reimbursement. Several suggestions have been offered as to
possible statutory sources for reimbursement within section 503. Section 503(b), section 503(b)(1)(A) and even section 503(b)(3)(D)" 2
have been cited with accompanying rationales as enabling courts to reimburse the section 1102 committees.
a.

Section 503(b)1 13

Section 503(b) states that "there shall be allowed administrative.
expenses . . . including-."" 4 Six subsections follow and list the possible
administrative expenses that might qualify as administrative expenses.' 1 5 The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
in In re Labine"8 expressed the view that Congress' use of the word
"including" at the end of the section 503(b) phrase does not limit the
types of administrative expenses that the section covers to those expenses specifically listed in the subsections. 1 7 Indeed, the Bankruptcy
Code provides that "including" is not a word of limitation.11 8 The
Labine court cited both the strong policy objectives for reimbursing unsecured creditors' committees for their expenses 1 9 and the previous
practice of reimbursement under the old rules as evidence that Congress intended for the practice to continue.12 0 "Congress assumed that
the word 'including' in section-503(b) allowed courts to continue to use
121
their discretion and/or continue their former practice.'

112. Section 503(b)(3)(D) not only imposes the higher standard for reimbursement upon
committees other than those appointed under section 1102; it also imposes this standard upon
individual creditors. This provides the potential means, mentioned in the text accompanying this
footnote, for committee members to obtain reimbursement. The individual creditor serving on
the committee comes forward and individually requests reimbursement pursuant to section
503(b)(3)(D). See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) (1988).
113. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1988i.
114. Id.
115. Id. § 503(b)(l)-(6) (1988).
116. 42 B.R. 883 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984).
117. Id. at 887-88.
118. See 1 U.S.C. § 102(3) (1988); see also In re George Worthington Co., 921 F.2d 626,
633 (6th Cir. 1990).
119. Labine, 42 B.R. at 885 (unsecured creditors deterred from committee participation if
expense reimbursement disallowed).
120. Id. at 887-88.
121. Id. at 888.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/9
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Section 503(b)(1)(A)

22

There is also judicial support for using section 503(b)(1)(A) as a
statutory source for reimbursement. In In re Jennings,'2 3 the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania observed that
section 503(b)(1)(A)'s allowance for reimbursement of "the actual,
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate"' 2 4 could serve as
authority to reimburse official unsecured, creditors' committees.' 2 5 The
court viewed expenses incurred by the unsecured creditors' committee
as "incurred toward the betterment of the estate and to the benefit of
the estate."' 26 This type of contribution could be classified as "preserving the estate" and therefore, section 503(b)(l)(A) would be apposite.
"The statutory duties imposed upon the committee presume that such
activities are essential to the preservation of the estate."' 12 7 Hence, section 503(b)(1)(A) is another potential statutory source for reimbursement if a committee can show that its contribution preserved the
debtor's estate.
c.

Section 503(b)(3)(D) 2

8

Finally, section 503(b)(3)(D) itself is used as a means for reimbursing the expenses of the unsecured committee members. Unsecured
creditors have creatively focused on the second word in section
503(b)(3)(D) to support their efforts toward reimbursement. That second word is "creditor." Section 503(b)(3)(D) not only provides reimbursement for a "committee . . . other than a committee appointed
under section 1102," it also authorizes reimbursement of "a creditor
who makes a substantial contribution in the case."' 2 9 Therefore, the
creditors serving on section 1102 committees have requested reimbursement as individual entities. Many courts have consented to the use of
this pathway to reimbursement,'
but argument has been made
against it.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California in
In re Major Dynamics, Inc. 31 confronted the issue when an individual
122. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988).
123. 96 B.R. 500 (E.D. Pa 1989).
124. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(I)(A) (1988).
125. Jennings, 96 B.R. at 501-02.
126. Id. at 504 (citation omitted).
127. In re Global Int'l Airways Corp., 45 B.R. 258, 261 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984).
128. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) (1988).
129. Id.
130. See In re Windsor Communications Group, Inc., 54 B.R. 504 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985);
In re General Oil Distrib. Inc., 51 B.R. 794 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Farm Bureau Serv.,
Inc., 32 B.R. 69 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982); In re Grynberg, 19 B.R. 621 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982);.
131.by eCommons,
16 B.R. 279 (Bankr.
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creditor sought reimbursement for costs incurred while serving on the
section 1102 committee. 3 2 The court's response was grounded in common sense:
The subsection read as a whole does not provide for reimbursement to a
creditor who is also a member of the section 1102 official creditors committee. It would indeed be anomalous to allow individuals on a committee to recover costs out of the estate when the Code does not provide
such reimbursement to the creditors' committee itself.1 3
d.

Weighing Section 503 Options

Of the three means for using section 503 to gain reimbursement,
the most viable is grounded in section 503(b). Section 503(b)(1)(A),
which requires efforts to preserve the estate, does not reach far enough
to entail the expenses incurred by the activities of the official unsecured
creditors' committees. Unsecured creditors' committees are not formed
to preserve the estate but rather their purpose is to guard the interests
of the unsecured creditors.1 34 The unsecured creditors may decide that
the debtor's reorganization is not in their best interests and prefer the
debtor to liquidate.1 35 The primary function of the committee is to act
as a watchdog to ensure that the debtor is not making decisions which
would adversely affect the unsecured creditors overall. This function
may or may not result in the preservation of the estate as required by
section 503(b)(1)(A).
Section 503(b)(3)(D) is also an inadequate avenue for seeking reimbursement. The Major Dynamics court took a common sense approach to defeating an individual creditor's application for reimbursement for expenses incurred in committee service.' 6 As the court
asserted, it would be anomalous to allow an individual creditor on the
committee to receive reimbursement for the same expenses incurred by
other committee members, but to reject the committee's request for reimbursement as a whole. 37 This would be a back door approach to
achieve the same result. Therefore, the ordinary administrative expenses of individual creditors serving on the section 1102 committee

132. Id.
133. Id. at 280.
134. See NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 52.12, at 14 (1991) (while participating in the formulation of a reorganization plan, committee working toward making "the best
, possible deal for the class it represents").
135. Id. § 52.11, at 13 (upon investigation of the debtor's activities and financial status,
committee can recommend an immediate discontinuance of the debtor's business to minimize loss
to the unsecured creditors).
136. Major Dynamics, 16 B.R. 279.
137. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss1/9
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should not be reimbursed based upon section 503(b)(3)(D)'s reference
to a. "creditor." ' 13 8
Section 503(b) allows reimbursement for administrative expenses
generally. In addition, the word "including" at the end of the section
503(b) phrase, followed by an enumeration of qualifying administrative
expenses, does not limit the class of administrative expenses. The bankruptcy courts are bound to recognize the enumerated categories that
follow section 503(b) but are also free to allow reimbursement for
other administrative expenses. By listing six specific types of expenses
after the section 503(b) term "including," Congress was in effect outlining the boundaries of reimbursable administrative expenses. Therefore, a court considering the reimbursement of a particular expense
should use the types of expenses enumerated under section 503 as a
guideline for its discretionary allowance or disallowance of reimbursement. As stated in a House Report to the Reform Act of 1978: "Siubsection (b) specifies the kinds of administrative expenses that are allowable in a case under the bankruptcy code." 13' 9 For example, if a
committee seeks reimbursement for airline expenses incurred by committee members in flying spouses to a committee meeting spot, a court
could reject such a request since the expense falls outside of the types
or kinds of expenses which are listed. Subsections (1) through (6) list
expenses incurred by entities which are participants in the reorganization process, and a spouse would not qualify.
Using section 503(b) as the statutory basis for reimbursing committee expenses, it is still necessary to select a proper standard which
regulates when expenses should be reimbursed.. The standard for reimbursement of section 1102 expenses should be an "actual and necessary" standard. This is because section 503(b)(3)(D) has expressly excluded section 1102 committees from the requirement that a
substantial contribution be made. In addition, the actual and necessary
standard would perpetuate the standard used in Rule 11-29(c) of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.140 In In re Aviation Technical Support,

138. This does not preclude an individual creditor who has made a substantial contribution
in the case from recovering for its expenses thereby incurred. Whether a creditor has satisfied the
"substantial" threshold is a question of fact. In re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d 1249,
1253 (5th Cir. 1986). The principal test of substantial contribution is the extent of the benefit to

the estate. 3 COLLIER

ON BANKRUPTCY,

503.04, at 503-48 to 503-49 (1990). In addition, an

examination of the facts should reveal that the creditor's outlay directly benefitted the estate. In re
Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47 B.R. 557, 569 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985). Mere administrative expenses incurred by an individual creditor in attending and conducting committee functions would
not satisfy this threshold since these types of expenses do not extensively nor directly benefit a
debtor's estate.
139. HR. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 355 (1977) (emphasis added).
140.by Discussion
of the
scope of the actual and necessary standard has been centered around
Published
eCommons,
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Inc.,' the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas agreed
that the actual and necessary standard should be used to determine
which expenses of an official unsecured creditors' committee should be
paid from the estate.1" 2 That court stated that since the official committee is clearly excluded from application of the substantial contribution
standard pursuant to section 503(b)(3)(D), the actual and necessary
standard is the appropriate. one. 43
C. Miscellaneous Approaches
Bankruptcy courts have often gone to great lengths to rationalize
their allowance of reimbursement to official unsecured creditors' committees. The courts' efforts manifest a desire to resolve the issue permanently. Each court attempts to put forth an argument that other courts
may have overlooked and which supports its viewpoint. Courts have
scrutinized the prior and subsequent legislative history of the Code for
a hint of what the correct answer might be to the question of whether
the courts are authorized to allow reimbursement of the administrative
14 4
expenses of official unsecured creditors' committees.
The district court in In re Jennings cited the legislative history of
section 503 to prove that Congress intended for reimbursement to continue pursuant to the enactment of the Code.1 4 5 The court first noted
that there is no evidence that Congress did not intend for official unsecured creditors' committees to be reimbursed. 4 6 Second, the court
emphasized the greater responsibility placed upon the committee under
the new Code.14 7 The Code decreased the former intense involvement
of the court and supplemented the void With the expectation that the

permits the imputation of this discussion to the actual and necessary standard as might be applied
to section 503 reimbursement. As indicated in In re Bible Deliverance Evangelistic Church, 39
B.R. 768, 774 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984), the actual and necessary standard is a liberal one, although estimates are insufficient to satisfy the actual criterion. In re Marsh, 14 B.R. 615, 617
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981). Requests must be for those expenses which were actually incurred. Id. If
an expense is incurred because it was required to accomplish an objective of the entity, the expense satisfies the necessary criterion. In re Wildman, 72 B.R. 700, 731 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987).
Case-by-case analysis is appropriate. In re Aztec Co., 113 B.R. 414, 415 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1990).
141. 72 B.R. 32 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 34.
144. See, e.g., Aviation Technical, 72 B.R. at 34 (court accepted reasoning in In re Labine,
42 B.R. 883 (Bankr. E.D. Mich 1984), that legislative history of section 503 reveals Congressional
intent to add expenses of official committees as a seventh subsection to section 503(b)).
145. 96 B.R. 500, 504 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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committees would more actively participate in the reorganization process." 8 The court stressed that Congress could not have intended to
provide a disincentive for unsecured creditors to participate by suddenly refusing to reimburse their administrative expenses. 49 This
would effectively defeat the Code's new purpose of increased committee
participation.
The bankruptcy court in In re Labine' 50 cited the frustrated Congressional attempts to amend the Code with reference to this issue as
further evidence of Congress' intent to reimburse unsecured creditors'
committees for their administrative expenses.'15 At the time Labine
was decided, the President had just "signed into law the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984."'15 As a result of
these amendments, the troublesome section 503 ended with a semicolon
and the word "and.' 53 Nothing followed the word "and."' 54 The court
explained: "[T]he Congress, the.government printer, or a clerk, neglected to include the paragraph which was obviously intended to follow the 'and.' ,,151 The omitted paragraph would have added expenses
of official unsecured creditors' committees to the list of enumerated section 503 administrative expenses.' 56 The Labine court viewed this
omission as evidencing an accidentally unfulfilled intent to allow
57
reimbursement.1
One final example of a court's use of legislative history to justify
reimbursing official unsecured creditors' committees can be found in In
re Global InternationalAirway Corp. 58 In Global International, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri cited an exchange between Senators DeConcini and Dole who were discussing the
concern for section 1102 committees and their opportunities for expense reimbursement.' 5 9 Both senators agreed that the well-settled

148. Id.
149. Id.
Congress had to have an expectation that the committee would participate in the reorganization process. Otherwise, no one would represent the unsecured creditors who, having already invested without recourse in the debtor, would be unlikely to continue to do so unless
assured that continued efforts would not be at their own expense and thus represent additional investment for which there was little hope of recovery."
Id. (emphasis added).
150. 42 B.R. 883 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984).
151. Id. at 887-88.
152. Id. at 887.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 887-88.
158. 45 B.R. 258 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984).
159. byId.
at 260 (exchange
Published
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1991recorded in 130 CONG. REC. S13772, Part II (daily ed. Oct. 5,
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practice of reimbursing these committees was intended to and should
continue. 16 0
These references to legislative history are, at best, helpful in deducing Congress' intent. They do not, however, resolve the problem
that the Code contains no authority to reimburse official creditors'
committees. As discussed in Part II of this note, the Federated court
cited section 105 and thereby used the discretionary powers of the
court "to carry out the provision of this title. 1 6 1 The committee in
Federated was appointed pursuant to section 1114 and the court indicated that, in order for the committee to function as it was intended
under the Code, -it
was necessary that the committee be reimbursed for
its administrative expenses.1 6 2 A contrary result might discourage potential participants from becoming committee members at all and actual participants from actively participating. 6 This same logic would
apply to section 1102 committees. Section 105 could be used with the
justification that, in order to facilitate carrying out section 1102 "of
this title," such committees should be reimbursed. Alternatively, a
court could follow the approach in Worthington and cite the entire
statutory scheme together with the legislative history as its authority to
reimburse. But, must a court deviate from the Code's more explicit
provisions in order to reimburse statutory committees while awaiting
Congress' clarification of the morass?
D. Summary
Generally, courts have been eager to reimburse official unsecured
creditors' committees. Even courts which have denied' reimbursement,
explaining that it is Congress' responsibility to provide the courts with
a statutory source, have concomitantly acknowledged the reasons that
make reimbursement desirable. The court in GHR Energy aptly stated

160. Id. at 260-61.
DeConcini: "Would you agree that [creditors' committee expenses] should be paid and that
nothing in the recently enacted Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act would
suggest a different construction?"
Dole: "I absolutely agree. It is essential for the orderly and professional administration of
bankruptcy cases, that creditors and creditors' committees that incur reasonable and necessary expenses in their service on creditors' committees be reimbursed. Nothing . . . was
meant to change the well-settled practice."
Id.
161.
162.
163.

See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text; see also II U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
121 B.R. 332, 334 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
Id.
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the reasons that official unsecured creditors' committees should be reimbursed: "Forcing [committee] members to finance their participation in a Chapter 11 case seems particularly unfair when their pocketbook interests have already been damaged because of their relationship
with the debtor."1 64 The GHR Energy court also referred to the overall
scheme of the Code as warranting reimbursement.1 5 "[W]ith the
bankruptcy judge removed from active participation in the case and the
preference for leaving the debtor in possession, a [section] 1102 committee has a more important role in terms of monitoring the debtor's
business life and developing the terms of the plan of reorganization." 6 6
The prudent course of action is for courts to reimburse these committees using section 503(b) as their statutory basis. The section
503(b) language is straightforward in its directive: "there shall be allowed administrative expenses. '167 The word "including" which completes the phrase is not a word of limitation. Therefore, the itemized
list of administrative expenses that follows section 503(b) does not necessarily close the class of expenses for which a court might grant reimbursement. Use of section 503(b) would also enable a court to contemplate the overall statutory scheme and the legislative history 68 as well
as the goal "to carry out the provisions of this title." '6 9 The bonus is
that the court would be acting pursuant to statutory authorization. Judicial legislating could no longer be charged. Until Congress acts, section 503(b) provides the best alternative as a statutory source of authority for the courts to grant reimbursement of administrative
expenses for official unsecured creditors' committees.
V.

CONCLUSION

Bankruptcy courts generally want to allow reimbursement for official unsecured creditors' committees but are hesitant to usurp legislative power. Therefore, courts are grappling with the Code in its present
form to find statutory authority for the allowance. Various Code sections and the legislative history have been cited as justification for judicial action or inaction. As yet, no consensus has been reached regarding
whether or where the authority to allow or to deny reimbursement can
be found within the Code.

164. 35 B.R. 539, 542-43 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983).
165. Id. at 543.
166. Id.
167. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
168. See In re George Worthington Co., 921 F.2d 626, 634 (6th Cir. 1990).
169. See In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 121 B.R. 332, 334 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990)
(relying upon II U.S.C. § 105).
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It is advisable to reimburse official unsecured creditors' committees because refusing to reimburse them could act as a disincentive to
the creditors' active participation in the Chapter 11 reorganization process. Section 503(b) is best suited to serve as the statutory authority to
achieve this ideal. Courts should uniformly rely upon section 503(b)
and hereafter reimburse the administrative expenses of official unsecured creditors' committees. At present, an official unsecured creditors' committee cannot be certain whether its expenses will be reimbursed until it submits its request to the court. If all courts followed the
same course of action, the result would be greater fairness to litigants
who would be better able to anticipate what the response to their requests would be. Until Congress acts to eradicate the confusion, the
courts should inject certainty into committee service and consistently
reimburse official unsecured creditors' committees for their actual and
necessary administrative expenses.
Judith A. Lintz
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